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Russia is not a military or economic superpower anymore, but is still an energy 
superpower. It’s advantage? Russia controls the access to the energy resources on 
its own territory and the ones in its “close vicinity”. Considering the geostrategic 
energy resources, the Caspian Sea is a “Russian lake” or a “mare nostrum”. 
Bearing in mind that the Middle East is under “American control” and in con-
flict for thirty years, and China became a “black hole” in this field, absorbing 
anything it can, the Caspian area appeared for the European consumers “the 
promised land” of energy, especially after the implosion of the communist system. 
Now,  here  we  find the  most  important  international  actors:  Russia,  USA, 
European Union and China. Will the Caspian area become a new “Middle 
East”? 
 
Key words: geostrategic energy resources, European Union, Russia, energy re-
sources geopolitics. 
 
     t     t    
Energy security is probably the most frequently used term in current 
literature  and  discussions  concerning  world  economy.  Even  the 
strongest regional bloc in the world, the European Union, has this The Romanian Economic Journal 
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problem  on  its  agenda,  strongly  reaffirmed  by  Germany,  which 
held/exercised the presidency of the Union through the first semester 
of 2007 – through the voice of its Foreign Affairs Minister, Frank-
Walter Steinmeir, who declared “energy security as a priority of this 
mandate.” If we add the standpoint on this issue of the world’s great-
est power, the United States (together with the European Union it 
makes for approximately two thirds of the world GDP), we will have 
an even better understanding of how great the importance of energy 
resources is, and particularly that of strategic ones (oil and natural gas).  
The world’s hydrocarbon reserves (oil and natural gas) are unevenly 
spread all over the Globe, the majority of both developed, as well as 
developing  countries being  importers  of  oil  (and oil products) and  
gas. 
 
                                       t               t    
The doubtless world oil reserves are estimated, today, at approximately 
140 billion tons. 
Apparently paradoxical, these are a lot larger than 25 years ago (ap-
proximately 87 billion tons), not to mention almost 70 years ago (4 bil-
lion tons in 1938). Because oil doesn’t form in historical times, we find 
the explanation in the fact that, these days, there are methods which 
allow a more correct evaluation of deposits. 
Same as in the case of other resources, oil deposits are actually con-
centrated as spatial distribution. Thus: 
•  Approximately 70% of the planet’s proved reserves are found 
on the Asian continent, mainly under the sand of the deserts in the 
Middle East (between 62 and 66% out of the world total). This region 
is also the home of the richest countries in terms of oil: Saudi Arabia 
(approximately 35 billion tons – almost a quarter out of the world to-
tal), Iran (approximately 18 billion tons), Iraq (approximately 16 billion 
tons), Kuwait and The United Arab Emirates (each of the two coun-
tries with more than 13 billion tons); The Romanian Economic Journal 
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The Middle East is the most fragile place in the world’s geopolitical 
system; it is the place where continents meet, it is the place where the 
cultures and great religions of mankind meet. 
•  Approximately 15% is located in America (especially the Gulf 
of Mexico area), out of which, the following stand out: Venezuela (ap-
proximately 11 billion tons), Mexico (depends on the source, between 
2,5 and 5 billion tons) and U.S.A.. The last studies point Canada out-
running Mexico on the list of rich hydrocarbons areas;  
•  There are added a few other „oil areas” like the Caspian Sea 
Area, which, according to recent estimates, would be the second re-
gion on the planet in this field (this is the explanation of the project 
„The Road of Caspian Energy to Europe”), Saharan North Africa, 
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Fig. no. 1 – World oil reserves, production and consumption 
 
The past several years have pointed out another energy resource, natu-
ral gas, which, left in the hands of only one actor, in the context of 
many beneficiaries depending on him, my become an instrument of 
force in influencing the foreign policy of those respective countries. 
The world’s certain natural gas reserves are currently appreciated at 
about 177 thousand billion m
3 and they are concentrated particularly 
in three countries: Russia (over one quarter of the world’s total), Iran 
and Qatar (each with approximately 15% of world certain reserves).     
In what concerns the production, we notice two important countries, 
which hold the top places: Russia and the United States (with over 500 
billion m
3 each), followed, at long distance, by Canada, Great Britain 
and Iran. The same two countries (Russia and the United States) are 
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Fig. no. 2 – World gas reserves, production and consumption 
 
Russia, the world’s largest producer (and its second consumer), holds 
dependent almost entire Europe (basically, with the exception only of 
the Netherlands, Norway and Great Britain, who provide their neces-
sary by themselves, from their internal production). Being energy de-
pendent on one source is, for obvious reasons, dangerous, the more 
dangerous the more the “supplier” has interests contrary to those of 
the “beneficiary” and the more it has the possibility to force its hand 
or to “punish” it. 
 
                        t                  t    
           t      The  Caspian  Sea,  situated  at  the  border  between 
Europe and Asia, despite its vast surface (371 800 km
2) and its name 
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(sea), is, in fact, a lake. From here forth the main difficulty regarding 
the splitting of the continental plateau (and, implicitly, dividing the 
propriety of oil resources) between the five countries in the area (Rus-
sia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Iran). Russia relishes 
the approach of the Caspian Sea as an international lake, which allows it 
to exploit at its will, “in international waters”; in exchange, Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan appeal to the “law of the sea”. 
Although appreciated as large, there isn’t a unity among opinions re-
garding the area’s oil reserves: 1.3 billion tons (“Oil and Gas Journal”), 
2.6 billion tons (“Statistical Review of World Energy”, edited by Brit-
ish Petroleum), 4 to 4.5 billion tons (estimates of some large compa-
nies) all the way to 2.5 times greater than those of the Saudi oil field 
Ghawar (estimated at almost 12 billion tons
1). The Tengiz resource 
alone, situated to the north of the Caspian, on the territory of Kazakh-
stan, appears to hold between 10 and 15 billion tons, which represents 
twice as much as all the oil in the North Sea. Likewise, many sources 
indicate  the  Caspian region  as  the  second  largest  oil  region  in  the 
world, following the Middle East.  
Given the fact that the Middle East has been for almost 30 years an 
area of ongoing conflicts, affecting deliveries (and, implicitly, prices) 
and, mainly those of oil, the Caspian Sea’s entering the spotlight has 







                     
1 According to Energy choices in the Middle East, The Centre for Strategic and International 
Studies, Washington DC, 2000. The Romanian Economic Journal 
 
















Fig. no. 3 – The Caspian Basin 
The energy basin of the Caspian Sea presents at least two advantages 
to that of the Middle East: 
•  it is closer to the West (the beneficiary countries); 
•  it is more settled (there have been and there still are conflicts – 
those in the Caucasus, Chechnya and so on – but no wars). 
Azerbaijan,  Kazakhstan  and  Turkmenistan  are  the  three  republics 
separated from the former Soviet empire that have already started to 
have a powerful say in what regards energy resources at the beginning 
of the 21
st century. The oil and gas reserves discovered here, but insuf-
ficiently explored, have caught the attention of the developed world, 
and, these hydrocarbons must reach Europe by routes that would not The Romanian Economic Journal 
 
Year X, no. 25 bis                                                                November 2007 
272 
create dependencies, more so since there already are two other big 
producers in the area, namely the Russian Federation and the Gulf 
countries.  
Therefore, the problem of the Caspian resources is no longer an eco-
nomic problem, but also a political one, reason why, to date, neither 
the European Union, nor the United States possesses a clear strategy 
towards the Caspian and, particularly, towards neighboring Russia.  
In 2005, for example, the cumulated production of these three coun-
tries was less than 100 million tons, more exactly 94.9 million tons (a 
lot under the potential), the partition among the countries being as fol-
lows: Kazakhstan – 63 million tons, Azerbaijan – 22.4 mil tons and 
Turkmenistan – 9.5 mil tons. 
Given the facts, two problems remain unsolved. The first consists of 
the financial capabilities of the aforementioned countries to invest in 
prospecting and exploration facilities. The second relates to the means 
of transporting the respective resources towards the markets they will 
be distributed on. With the exception of the BTC pipeline (Baku – 
Tbilisi – Ceyhan), the existing oil pipelines only connect to the Russian 
Federation, and, anyhow, can not stand the quantities of oil that are to 
be pumped.  
In order for the Caspian oil to reach Europe, and, considering the fact 
the oil pipelines in the Caspian have the eastern shore of the Black Sea 
as there destination, and the transit through the Bosporus and the 
Dardanelle is limited from an ecological point of view but also in what 
regards transportation capacity, there are talks about building a new 
route from the western shore of the Black Sea towards the West, in-
side the European continent. Among the projects from the Caspian 
Sea towards Europe, we note: 
•  Burgas – Alexandropolis; 
•  Constanta – Omisalji – Trieste; 
•  Odessa – Brody – Gdansk; The Romanian Economic Journal 
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•  Turkmenistan towards Central and Western Europe, via Azer-
baijan and Georgia; 
•  Turkey – Bulgaria – Romania. 
 
                t     There are a few categories of actors involved 
in the “Caspian energy route”: 
a)      t     t  t        t               (Russia, Azerbai-
jan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan; Iran is yet to draw any attention for 
projects regarding hydrocarbons); 
b)                              t     (mainly the European 
Union and the United States, but also China and Japan); 
c)                  t      t  t     t     t   by the oil and 
natural gas (mainly Georgia, Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania); 
d)                    (Exxon, Mobile and others – US, ENI 
and Agip – Italy, British Gas – UK, Royal Dutch/Shell – the Nether-
lands). 
Following  the  Soviet  Union’s  implosion  (1991),  the  power  from 
Kremlin found itself forced to promote collaborative relations with 
the great Western Powers, mainly with the US. This was not due to its 
sympathy for the western democratic system but to the desire to over-
come, with Western help, the economic and political crisis. In turn, to 
counteract the conservative potential of ex-communist origin, seeking 
restoration, the Western powers caved in and made many concessions: 
they tolerated exaggerate claims on the part of the Russian Federation 
to be recognized as “the only descendant and continuer” of the for-
mer Soviet Union (this included permanent membership in the UN 
Security Council, even though Ukraine had a similar request), estab-
lished the Common NATO-Russia Council (practically giving Russia 
the ability to legally express its veto regarding the Alliance’s actions) The Romanian Economic Journal 
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and they included it in the group of the most developed countries, the 
famous G7 becoming the G8. 
                t    t        t     t                          
       t       t          t      t    t   t       t         t    
                                t           t       t           
                  t         t       t    t                    
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            t                     t                   t      
   t  t      t    t    t      t                              t   
Since the American power was surely to be the main security supplier for 
the former communist countries as well as for others, Russia chose to 
be their energy supplier. It uses its energy resources, and not seldom, for 
playing “political tap”: “the gas war” with Ukraine and Georgia (2006), 
“the electric energy war” with Georgia (2005), the psychological pres-
sure put on the European Union (especially concerning natural gas) 
and on Japan (oil) after having signed the contracts with China in 
2006, whom is going to receive large quantities of both hydrocarbons 
that might affect deliveries to the other commercial partners. 
 
In the same spirit of “political tap” we find the attitude, might we even 
say the boycotting by Russia of the energy projects initiated by Roma-
nia  (the  Constanta-Trieste  oil  pipeline)  or  to  which  Romania  is  a 
member (the NABUCCO gas pipeline).    
 
                                          t          
Romania, who was one of the world’s biggest producers and, at the 
same time, exporters of oil between the two World Wars, and respec-
tively, of gas, after World War II (in both cases, ranking 4
th), is, at pre-
sent, an importer of both. Its oil production (5.2 – 5.4 million tons 
annually), as well as its natural gas production (10 -13 billion m
3) are 
insufficient to cover the country’s consumption need, Romania be-
coming a net importer. As a consequence, Romania has become very The Romanian Economic Journal 
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interested in the grand energy projects, particularly in those generically 




Fig. no. 4 – Routes of Caspian Energy 
 
 
                                       t  t         t     
t                                    
On April 3rd, 2007 the agreement (“Ministerial Declaration”) concern-
ing the building of the oil pipeline Constanta (Romania) – Trieste (It-
aly) was signed in Zagreb, the capital of Croatia. Besides the three 
countries, Serbia and Slovenia were signatories as well. The document 
was also signed by Andris Piebalgs, the European Commissioner for The Romanian Economic Journal 
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Energy, thus confirming the European Commission’s interest and full 
support for the PEOP. 
The initiative: It belongs to Romania, but has the support of the Euro-
pean Commission. The project isn’t actually new, as it participated in 
the 1998 competition, when the winner was announced (with the oc-
casion of the OSCE Conference in Istanbul, in November 1999) to be 
the Turkish project BTC (Baku – Tbilisi - Ceyhan), given also the sup-
port and the interests of the United States and Great Britain, although 
the Romanian one presented a great deal more advantages, among 
which: 
•  Shorter land route (1,400 km as opposed to the BTC’s 2,000 
km); 
•  Two thirds of the pipes already existed, lacking only to be con-
nected; 
•  The  absence  of  areas  of  conflict  (within  Turkey,  the  BTC 
crossed through the Kurdish territory); 
•  It traverses only low regions, the BTC requiring many pumping 
facilities (about 20), etc.; 
•  Constanta harbor has large facilities for the storage of oil and its 
subsequent distribution through pipeline; 
•  Romania has greater oil refining capacity (of over 30 million 
tons per year), surpassing by a lot internal production and con-
sumption needs. 
 
The Main Features of the Constanta – Trieste Oil pipeline: 
Length: 1 360 km. Capacity: according to the feasibility study, performed 
by a consortium coordinated by Hill International UK, three alterna-
tive transporting capacities were being contemplated – 40, 60 or 90 
million tons / year. Costs: $2.27 billion, $2.81 billion or $4.26 billion, The Romanian Economic Journal 
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depending on the chosen alternative. Completion Deadline: 2009, 2011 or 
2012. Purpose: the transporting of oil from the Caspian Sea region (es-
pecially  from  Kazakhstan    and  Azerbaijan),  through  the  Black  Sea 
(from the Caucasian oil ports, particularly, Supsa, Georgia to Con-
stanta, Romania, the biggest port in the Black Sea region) towards 
Western Europe.          
 
  Fig. no. 5 – The Pan European Oil Pipeline (PEOP) 
 
This pipeline contributes to reducing the European Union’s depend-
ency on Russian and Middle Eastern oil. 
The targeted market for the PEOP project Constanta – Trieste is, ob-
viously,  the  European  Union;  its  terminal  point  is  Trieste  because 
from there on the connection with the Trans Alpine Pipeline Network 
becomes possible, through which Austria, Germany and other West 
European states could be supplied. 
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Advantages:   
•  The shortest route to Central and Western Europe. Note: An-
other agreement signed in April 2007 was initiated this time by 
Russia, for a similar pipeline, with the route Burgas (Bulgaria) – 
Alexandropolis (Greece, north of the Aegean Sea); Only that in 
order for the oil to be forwarded farther, to Western Europe, 
the distance and, implicitly, the costs are very high. 
•  It could provide for other countries on route (Romania, Serbia, 
Croatia and Slovenia) or nearby (Bulgaria, Hungary, Austria), all 
dependant,  either  totally  or  partially,  on  imported  oil;  this 
means the oil pipeline could be “doubled” or even “tripled”. 
•  The oil pipeline could be doubled by a gas pipeline that could 
benefit from the arrangements made to accommodate the pipe-
line.   
 
                            
After the “gas war” between Russia and Ukraine (2005 - 2006), the 
European Commission regained its interest in the older NABUCCO 
project, as an “alternate source of energy”, meaning natural gas for 
Central Europe (its main beneficiary going to be Austria). “It’s not just 
a technical project, it is also a political one”, said the European Com-
missioner for Energy, Andris Piebalgs. 
Purpose: the transporting of natural gas form the Caspian Sea region 
(especially from Azerbaijan, although the “Iranian branch” is also un-
der consideration) towards Central Europe, with the route Turkey – 
Bulgaria – Romania – Hungary – Austria. Just like in the case of the 
Constanta – Trieste pipeline, the NABUCCO gas pipeline aims at nar-
rowing the dependency on Russia, who is the European Union’s main 
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The main features of the gas pipeline are: 
Length: 3,300 km. Capacity: 26 – 32 billion m
3/year, to begin 
with. Costs: approximately $5 billion (of which Romania is going to 
contribute $1 billion). The Companies that voiced their intention to par-
take in the building of the gas pipeline: OMV (Austria 
 Fig. no. 6 – The Nabucco 
Gas Pipeline 
–  around  50%,  TransGaz 
(Romania),  MOL (Hungary), 
BulgarGaz (Bulgaria) and Bo-
tas (Turkey). Completion Dead-
line:  beginning  of  works  in 
2008, partially operational in 
2011 and fully operational in 
2020. 
The completion of this pro-
ject surged in importance to 
the EU as, the agreements signed between China and 
Russia (concerning both types of hydrocarbons) in 2006, might render 
Russia’s satisfying EU’s need for gas impossible. 
Unfortunately, the agreement regarding the project has not yet been 
finalized  because  Turkey,  who  initially  enjoyed  the  idea  of 
NABUCCO, is now delaying its signing procedures. There are rumors 
that,  after  the  completion  of  the  aquatic  gas  pipeline  Blue  Stream 
(Russia - Turkey) traveling the bottom of the Black Sea (in November 
2005), Russia is influencing Turkey to consider building gas pipelines 
solely on its territory.    
 
            t                           tt    
When there is only one energy supplier to a number of countries, it 
can dispose at its whim the stoppage of exports or any reductions of 
afore established export quantities. Although, in many cases, technical The Romanian Economic Journal 
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reasons are thrown to the front, in reality they are by all means politi-
cal (to “punish” a certain country), thus the use of the “political tap”.  
Some analysts use the term of “Russian roulette”
1, which I consider 
improper: in the case of a “Russian roulette” the victim is aleatory (the 
person having the misfortune to pull the trigger when the bullet is in 
the front chamber), while in the case of the “political tap” the victim is 
“chosen” and certain. 
For instance, in the night of 21 to 22 January, 2006, two explosions 
affected the main stream and a secondary branch of the gas pipeline 
Mozdok – Tbilisi, the main pipeline alimenting two former Soviet re-
publics  (Georgia  and  Ukraine).  The  deflagrations  occurred  on  the 
Russian part, not far from the border with Georgia. Shortly after, an-
other  deflagration  also  cut  down  the  supply  of  electric  energy  to 
Georgia. 
The Russians accused the Georgians and the Armenians of “sabo-
tage”! In reality, they had no interest, since it all took place in the 
midst of winter (January!) and their reserves would only last for 24 
hours.  Therefore,  the  Georgian  president,  Saakashvili,  denounced 
Moscow’s  “blackmail”:  “For  a  long  time,  I  had  been  hearing  the 
threats of Russian politicians that we might be left without natural gas 
and power, and now it has happened.” 
Some analysts go further and notice many similar scenarios: 
□  After Russia substantially increased the price of its natural gas 
set for Ukraine and Georgia, the analysts regarding this as a 
form of reprisals following the “Georgian Revolution” in De-
cember 2003, the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine in Decem-
ber 2004, the “Tulip Revolution” in Kazakhstan in June 2005, 
GAZPROM also announced the increase in prices for the gas 
delivered to Belarus (starting 2007, the price tripled). It was be-
lieved that, actually, the Russian company wanted to take over 
                     
1 Russian roulette is a game in which you risk killing yourself by shooting at your head with a 
gun that has a bullet in only one of the six chambers. The Romanian Economic Journal 
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50%  of  the  stocks  of  Belarusian  contender  Beltrangaz,  the 
owner of the pipe nexus feeding Europe, in order to stop pay-
ing taxes to Belarus in stead of them themselves cashing in di-
rectly;  after  Belarus’  tough  reaction  (on  the  part  of  Russia’s 
most loyal political partner), the Kremlin caved in. 
□  Russia cancelled Algeria’s debt ($5 billion) on two conditions: 
o  First: the buying of $4 billion worth of weapons (40 MIG 
29s, 20s, SU-30 planes and 40 T-90 tanks); 
o  Second: GAZPROM’s access to its oil and gas fields, Al-
geria being Europe’s third energy supplier, after Russia 
and  Norway; in addition,  Algeria is also a  member  of 
OPEC.   
□  In March 2006, Russian president Vladimir Putin, signed to-
gether with Chinese resident Hu Jintao, an agreement by which 
they pledge to build two natural gas pipelines to China, thus be-
coming  the  country’s  number  1  supplier.  The  agreement 
spawned concern within the European Union, because the gas 
that was going to be delivered to China was to be extracted 
from Western Siberia, the same region that gives the gas Russia 
exports to Europeans. The deliveries were set to start in 2011, 
between 60 and 80 billion m
3 annually. Kremlin announced that 
Russia might also build an oil pipeline, thus upsetting Japan as 
well, since it could not meet both Asian demands. 
All  these  elements  –  and  others  may  be  added  (boycotting  the 
NABUCCO project – which also includes Romania –, the recent re-
opening of the Burgas-Alexandropolis oil pipeline and so on) – sug-
gest, according to some analyses, that Russia is currently transforming 
itself from a “defunct military superpower – although still nuclear – 
into a new energy superpower”
1.    
                     
1 ***, Russia’s Newly Found “Soft Power”, The Globalist, August 26, 2004. The Romanian Economic Journal 
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Blue Stream – A Small Pipeline, Great Significance. This gas pipeline was 
inaugurated with huge display on 17 November, 2005, in the presence 
of Russian president Vladimir Putin and Turkish prime-minister Recep 
Erdogan,  Italy’s  then  prime-minister,  Slivio  Berlusconi,  also  taking 
part. The explanation for this was apparently simple: Russia “offered” 
natural  gas,  Turkey  “benefited”,  and  Italy  was  participating  as  co-
constructers of the project, through ENI trust (together with Russian 
colossus GAZPROM). 
Several facts concerning the project: the underwater pipe (the deepest 
one on the Globe, at 2,150 m under sea level) is 309 km in length and 
links the ports of Drujba (Russia) and Samsun (Turkey). It is comple-
mented by 373 more kilometers on Russian land (from the gas fields 
of Izobilnoj) plus 501 km on Turkish territory (from Samsun to An-
kara, the country’s capital). Starting with 3.7 billion m
3 of natural gas, 
it is going to transport 15 billion m
3, and finally reach a double capac-
ity.    
Other  pipelines  have  been  inaugurated,  both  before  and  after,  but 
none arose so much interest. Analysts didn’t need much to notice that, 
in the middle of it, there was a long term, long range game that “opens 
new horizons for Russia”
1. Not by chance nor by coincidence did the 
Kremlin propose the building of other new pipelines to Turkey, trans-
porting not just gas, but also oil. These projects signal that “Moscow 
wishes to be thus capable of counterbalancing US-UK influence in the 
region (who were the promoters of the BTC oil pipeline, namely Baku 
–  Tbilisi  –  Ceyhan)  other  than  from  the  military  security  point  of 
view”
2. To put it differently, if the US has become the “security sup-
plier” for many of the former communist countries, Russia seeks to 
balance this by becoming their “energy supplier”, not just the supplier 
of South-Eastern Europe, but also of the European Union, precarious 
in terms of energy resources and a great deal dependent on Russia. 
                     
1 See, for example, Federico Bordonro, Blue Stream Opens New Horizons for Russia, “Power 
an Interest News Report”, November 21
st, 2005. 
2 Idem.  The Romanian Economic Journal 
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One may therefore appreciate that, in doing so, Russia wishes to win 
back its influence and protect its interests in Eastern Europe, at the 
same time augmenting its financial power and, why not, its political 
one as well
1.       
Caspian Pipeline Consortium. This represents another example of a pro-
ject through which Russia looks after its own interests, while affecting 
those  of  transit  countries  (mainly  Romania).  The  project  aims  to 
transport  oil  from  Kazakhstan  (from  the  great  field  of  Tengiz), 
through Russia, to the Black Sea, in the region of Novorosijsk port (a 




Length: 1,100 km, of which 752 km already existed (Tengiz – Komso-
molik - Kropotkin), and 258 km are going to be build afresh. Facilities: 
15 new pumping facilities, 13 storage tanks (each with a holding ca-
pacity of 100,000 m
3), 5 of which will be situated around Novorosijsk. 
Main  stakeholders:  the  Russian  government  (represented  by  Lukoil, 
Rosneft and Transneft) – 24%, Kazahoil – 19%, the government of 
Oman  –  7%,  LukArco  (JV  Lukoil  and  Atlantic  Richfield  -  US)  – 
12.5%, Rosneft Shell – 7.5%, Mobil (US) – 7.5%, Kaz Pipeline Ven-
tures (JV Kazahoil, Amoco, the former Holding Munai Gaz) – 7%, 
and others. Duration of project:  approximately 40 years; will operate at 
minimum capacity starting 2014. Revenues: Russia’s profits alone are 
estimated around $23 – 24 billion. 
                   t          
We are all familiar with OPEC’s role on the world scene following the 
“oil shock” of 1973, who knew how to exploit at its fullest the most 
                     
1 To grasp the entire broad array of problems, see also part 4 (Les points chauds du Globe) of 
Yves Lacoste, p. 206 – 328. 
2 Also refer to Terry Adams, Caspian Hydrocarbours, the Politicisation of Regional Pipelines 
and the Destabilization of the Caucasus, Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels, 
2000.    The Romanian Economic Journal 
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used and sought after strategic energy resource; there have been, of 
course, gaps along the way, but they do not concern the subject of this 
paper. Lately, there is talk about a similar gas cartel. Although some 
are  still  inclined  to  ascribe  the  paternity  to  Iranian  ayatollah  Ali 
Khamenei, who in January 2007 made a similar proposal, “Financial 
Times” used the term two months before (November 2006) when, 
quoting a NATO Report, it mentioned Russia’s desire to create such 
an  organization.  The  configuration  of  the  anticipated  cartel  is  ex-
tremely interesting, as it would contain Russia, some countries from 
the Gulf Region (Iran and Qatar), from North Africa (Libya and Alge-
ria) and from Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, 
and others). This would certainly wage a huge amount of power, since 
Russia and Iran alone concentrate 43% of the world’s natural gas re-
serves!     
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